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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction in this court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court correctly dismiss the Appellants Jose and Mildred 
Salazars' ("Salazars") Complaint against Appellee Robert L. Christensen 
("Christensen" or "Appellee") pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), where the 
Salazars sued Christensen personally for breach of a contract to which he was neither a 
signatory nor a party and the Salazars are unable to plead any facts to support any 
theory under which Christensen could be individually liable. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW: The propriety of a Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) dismissal is a question of law and 
the trial court's ruling is given no deference and reviewed under a correctness standard. 
Ho v. Jim's Enterprises, Inc.. 426 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 2001 UT 63 (Utah 2001). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the Salazars leave to 
amend their Complaint where: (1) the Salazars failed to follow well-established 
procedure for amendment, never making a motion as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b) 
and never submitting or filing any proposed amendment despite that they were free to 
do so at any time prior to dismissal, instead making only a fleeting reference to amend 
in one sentence of their memorandum in opposition to dismiss; (2) leave to amend 
would have been futile because the Salazars have demonstrated that even if they 
amended their complaint, they still would be unable to state any claim against 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Christensen individually; and 3) the Salazars' argument that they require discovery to 
attempt to find some claim against Christensen is contrary to well-established law and 
policy against discovery fishing expeditions? STANDARD OF REVIEW: The 
standard of review of denial to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion. Kasco Servs. 
Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992); Sulzenv. Williams, 977 P.2d 497, 500 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999). A trial court's ruling on a motion to amend a complaint will not 
be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion; under that standard, the Court of 
Appeals will not reverse the decision unless it exceeds the limits of reasonability. 
Neztsosie v. Mever, 883 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994); Jirard v. Applebv. 660 P.2d 245, 
248 (Utah 1983); Crossland Sav. v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This breach of contract action was originally commenced by the Salazars in 
August 2000 against Thrifty Nickel of Orem, Inc. ("Thrifty Nickel of Orem") and two 
other corporate entities, Want Ads of Salt Lake City, Inc., and Southern Cross, Inc., as 
well as two individuals, Norman Wilkinson and Appellee, Robert L. Christensen. (See 
Complaint at p. 1; R. 1.) Within one month of filing the Complaint, Appellants 
recognized the baselessness of the claims against Norman Wilkinson and voluntarily 
stipulated to their dismissal. (See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal; R. 15-16; R. 31-
32.) Shortly thereafter, the Court dismissed with prejudice all claims asserted by 
Appellants against Southern Cross, Inc. (See Order of Dismissal; R. 90-91.) 
2 
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The Salazars' Complaint asserts three separate contract-based causes of action 
arising out of their alleged employment agreement ("Agreement") with Defendant 
Thrifty Nickel of Orem. (See Complaint at 11 7-41; R. 2-6.) The Salazars asserted 
these same claims against all of the corporate and individual defendants, including 
Christensen. (See Complaint at 11 7-41; R. 2-6.) The Salazars seek to hold 
Christensen personally liable under the Agreement, despite the plain fact that 
Christensen is neither a named party to the Agreement, nor a signatory to it. (See 
Agreement attached to Complaint; R. 8, 10.) In asserting the claims against 
Christensen, the Salazars introduce a novel concept to contract and tort law: liability 
based solely on perceived personal wealth. 
Although there are no facts pled in the Complaint that would rationally support 
the inclusion of Christensen as a defendant in this case, at the hearing on Christensen's 
motion to dismiss, the Salazars' counsel succinctly articulated the real basis for the 
Salazars' claims against Christensen: "He is the father of this organization. The - it's 
his family, he's a mega-multi-millionaire well on his way to being a billionaire . . . ." 
(Transcript of hearing at p. 9:11, 18-20; R. 171.) (Emphasis added.) The Salazars' 
shocking disclosure of the true basis for their claims against Christensen suggests not 
only an extreme departure from Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a), but also invokes the strictures of 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b). Possibly even more outrageous, the Salazars candidly concede 
in their brief that they need discovery to find a claim against Christensen, stating that 
there are "facts yet to be discovered" (see Brief of Salazars at p. 37), "undiscovered 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
important issues" (see Brief of Salazars at p. 17), an "exhaustive list of areas that need 
to be explored to determine Robert Christensen's involvement in the case" (see Brief of 
Salazars at p. 29). 
After full briefing and a hearing, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick dismissed 
the Salazars' claims against Appellee Robert Christensen with prejudice on March 5, 
2001. (See Order of Dismissal; R. 159-160.) The Salazars do not really attack the 
propriety of the dismissal of their original complaint or make any substantive attempt to 
demonstrate that the few allegations in the Complaint concerning Christensen are 
sufficient to state a claim against him. Rather, the relief sought by the Salazars on 
appeal is amendment of the complaint so that they can conduct discovery to find facts 
upon which to base such amendment. (See Brief of Salazars at pp. 31, 36-37.) Yet, at 
the trial court level, other than a passing reference to amendment at the end of their 
memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss (see Salazars' Memorandum in 
Opposition at p. 8; R. 103), the Salazars made no attempt to comply with Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(b)(1)'s requirement of submitting a motion for leave to amend stating with 
particularity the reasons therefor and never prepared or proffered an amended 
complaint, much less filed one, which they were perfectly free to do under the rules. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1); Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). Instead, the Salazars lament that 
they were never allowed to conduct discovery that may have some day provided them 
with facts sufficient to state a claim against Christensen. (See Brief of Salazars at pp. 
31, 36.) The Salazars' belated, inappropriate, and legally insufficient request to amend 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to conduct discovery in order to find a claim against Christensen is a direct admission 
that, not only does the Complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
but also that the Salazars possess no facts that would allow them to state any claim 
against Christensen. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Salazars filed their Complaint against three separate corporate entities and 
two individuals, including Christensen, alleging "Breach of Contract" as the first 
"Cause of Action," "Failure to Maintain Medical Insurance" as the second "Cause of 
Action," and "Failure to Pay Vacation Pay" as the third "Cause of Action," against all 
of the Defendants under an alleged employment agreement between only the Salazars 
and Thrifty Nickel of Orem. (See Complaint at 11 38-47; R. 5-6.) The only parties to 
the alleged agreement attached to the Complaint are the Salazars and Thrifty Nickel of 
Orem. (See Agreement attached to Complaint; R. 8, 10.) Christensen was not a 
signatory or a named party to the alleged agreement. (See id.) 
The few "factual" allegations even mentioning Christensen are set forth below: 
• "Thrifty Nickel was and is owned in whole or in part by Defendant 
Christensen." (See Complaint at 1 21; R. 3.) 
• "Defendant Christensen is the controlling shareholder of more or less eighty-
six (86) entities publishing classified advertisement newspapers throughout 
5 
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the United States, most of which publish under the banner 'Thrifty Nickel.'" 
(See Complaint at 1f 28; R. 4.) 
• "Defendant Christensen is the sole shareholder of Want Ads of Salt Lake 
City, Inc. ["WASL"] and Southern Cross," two of the other corporate 
Defendants. (See Complaint at f 29; R. 4.) 
• "'ADVERTISE IT IN YOUR DYNAMIC THRIFTY NICKEL WANT ADS' 
is a trademark registered on July 13, 1992 in Utah and owned by Defendant 
Christensen or an entity ultimately owned and/or controlled by Defendant 
Christensen." (See Complaint at 1 30; R. 4.) 
• "In addition to being the sole shareholder of WASL, Defendant Christensen 
is a member of its board of directors." (See Complaint at 1 32; R. 4.) 
Based on these few neutral allegations, the Salazars allege in a conclusory 
fashion, contrary to fundamental tenets of corporate law, that "there should be no 
corporate veil distinguishing or protecting the assets of any of the five defendants." 
(See Complaint at 1 37; R. 5.) 
Additionally, the Salazars cite to allegations in affidavits and other materials 
outside of their Complaint in support of their claims, the most telling of which is that 
Christensen is a "mega multi-millionaire." (See Tr. of Hearing at p. 9:11, 18-20; R. 
171.) The extraneously filed affidavits additionally assert that the Salazars were friends 
of Christensen (see Affidavits of Jose and Mildred Salazar at 1 7; R. I l l , 115) and that 
6 
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Christensen discussed the alleged agreement around the dinner table with his son. (See 
Affidavit of Tim Taylor at t 4; R. 107.) However, the trial court apparently did not 
consider these extraneous materials and properly decided the case solely on the 
pleadings under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (See Order of Dismissal; R. 159-160.) 
Because the dismissal was based only on the allegations contained in the Complaint, 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the affidavits and other extraneous information 
cited by the Salazars are completely irrelevant to the legal sufficiency of the Complaint 
itself. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Colman v. Utah Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 
(Utah 1990). These materials outside the pleadings, therefore, should not be 
considered by the Court of Appeals. IcL Nevertheless, as discussed below, even if 
these deficient materials are considered, the Salazars are still unable to allege sufficient 
facts to hold Christensen liable for any claim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly dismissed the Salazars' Complaint with prejudice 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), because the Salazars have not demonstrated that 
they pled or could plead any set of facts that would result in Christensen being 
personally liable for breach of an employment agreement between the Salazars and 
Thrifty Nickel of Orem. Even if this Court considers all of the Salazars' allegations 
and extraneous filings, the Salazars still cannot state any cognizable claim against 
7 
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Christensen individually. See infra. This Court should therefore affirm the trial 
court's decision. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend the 
Complaint where: 1) the Salazars never filed a motion for leave to amend and never 
proposed or filed any amendment despite that they were free to at any time prior to 
dismissal; instead they merely requested leave in one sentence in their opposition to the 
motion to dismiss; 2) leave to amend would have been futile because even if the 
Salazars' Complaint and other extraneous materials presented by the Salazars are 
considered, there are no conceivable set of facts under which Christensen could be 
personally liable to the Salazars; and 3) the Salazars' argument that they should be 
allowed to conduct discovery in an attempt to find some yet unknown claim against 
Christensen upon which to base their amendment is directly contrary to well-established 
law and policy. See infra. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's sound 
decision. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE SALAZARS DID 
NOT AND CANNOT STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM AGAINST 
CHRISTENSEN. 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a party may obtain dismissal of a complaint 
where the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. "[T]he 
purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the form or sufficiency of the claim for 
relief, not to establish the facts or resolve the merits of a case." Whipple v. Am. Fork 
Irr. Co.. 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) (citing Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. 
Miller, Fed. Practice and Procedure. § 1356 (1990)).1 If it is apparent that as a matter of 
law the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged, then the court should dismiss 
the plaintiffs complaint. Harmon City. Inc. v. Nelson & Senior. 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 
(Utah 1995). 
Although all well-plead facts in the complaint are accepted as true on a motion to 
dismiss, "[IJiberal construction has its limits, for the pleading must at least set forth 
sufficient information for the court to determine whether some recognized legal theory 
exists upon which relief could be accorded the pleader. If it fails to do so, a motion under 
Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted." James Wm. Moore, Moore's Fed. Practice. § 12.341(b) 
1
 Because Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is identical to its counterpart under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, cases interpreting Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are persuasive when considering their state counterparts. See Barton 
v. Utah Transp. Auth.. 872 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1994); First Sec. Bank of Utah Nat'l 
Assoc, v. Conlin. 817 P.2d 298 (Utah 1991). 
9 
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(3rd ed. 1997). Where a complainant fails to allege essential elements of a cause of action, 
the complainant fails to give "fair notice" and, therefore, the complaint should be 
dismissed. See Connlev v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); See also Peterson v. Atlanta 
Hous. Auth., 998 F.2d 904, 912 (11th Cir. 1993). 
Dismissal of a cause of action is entirely proper where the party fails to state 
facts demonstrating all of the elements of a cause of action. DeBry v. Valley Mortgage 
Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008-1009 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Boisiolv v. Morton ThiokoL 
Inc., 706 F. Supp 795, 801 (D. Utah 1988); Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 
389 (6th Cir. 1998); Ledesma v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1983, 1984 
(D.C. Tex. 1993) ("If a complaint omits facts concerning pivotal elements of the 
pleader's claim, the court is justified in assuming the nonexistence of such facts.") 
Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to prevent the granting of a 
motion to dismiss. DeBry, 835 P.2d at 1008-1009; Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 
F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); 
Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254, 259 (D. Utah 1995). 
The Salazars failed to plead facts necessary to state a claim against Christensen 
for breach of the alleged employment agreement between the Salazars and Thrifty 
Nickel of Orem and cannot provide any factual basis for any other claims. Indeed, by 
filing three affidavits in an attempt to avoid dismissal of the Complaint, the Salazars 
tacitly conceded that the Complaint against Christensen was defective. The trial court 
10 
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was therefore correct in dismissing the deficient complaint as a matter of law and this 
Court should affirm. 
A. Christensen Cannot Be Personally Liable On An Employment 
Agreement Between The Salazars And Thrifty Nickel Of Orem. 
1. Christensen Cannot Be Personally Liable Under the 
Agreement, Because He is Neither a Party Nor a Signatory 
to the Alleged Agreement. 
The Salazars' claims are based entirely on a written contract attached to the 
Complaint entitled "Employment Agreement," allegedly between the Salazars and 
"Thrifty Nickel." (See Agreement attached to Complaint; R. 8-10.) Thrifty Nickel is 
defined in the Complaint as "Thrifty Nickel of Orem, Inc." (See Complaint at 1 2; R. 
2.) Thrifty Nickel of Orem, Inc. is a named defendant and is identified in both the 
caption and opening paragraph of the Complaint as a "Utah corporation." (Complaint 
at p. 1; R. 1.) 
Christensen is neither a party nor a signatory to the contract attached to the 
Salazars' Complaint. (See Agreement attached to Complaint; R. 8, 10.) Where 
allegations are contrary to the clear and unambiguous terms of a written agreement 
attached to the complaint, the agreement controls and mere conclusions to the contrary 
should be rejected. Olpin v. Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co.. 419 F.2d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 
1969); cert, denied. 397 U.S. 1074 (1970). As the court noted in Zeligson v. Hartman-
Blair. Inc.. 126 F.2d 595, 597 (10th Cir. 1942), "[t]he writing was attached to the first 
amended complaint as an exhibit and its legal effect is to be determined by its terms 
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rather than by the allegations of the pleader." (Citations omitted.) IcL; see also Utah 
R. Civ. P. 10(c). The writing here, the alleged agreement attached to the Complaint, is 
thus fundamentally inconsistent with any claim that Christensen is liable under it 
because he is neither a party nor a signatory to the agreement. 
A party is not liable on a contract where he is not a signatory. Shire Dev. v. 
Frontier Invs.. 799 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah App. 1990); County of Suffolk v. Long Island 
Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1984). Thus, absent some other theory of 
liability, Christensen cannot be held liable under an alleged agreement to which he is 
not a party. IcL Yet, no separate claims against Christensen have been alleged in the 
Complaint. 
2. As a Mere Shareholder of Thrifty Nickel of Orem, 
Christensen is Not Personally Liable for Its Debts. 
It is a fundamental principle of corporate law that shareholders are not personally 
liable for the debts of a corporation. Harry G. Henn, Law of Corporations, §§ 73, 202 
(2nd ed. 1970). Utah has explicitly codified this principle in Utah Code Ann. §16-
10(a)-622(2). It provides in pertinent part, " . . . a shareholder or subscriber for shares 
of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation solely 
by reason of the ownership of the corporation's shares." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10(a)-
622(2); Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James Constr.. 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In James, the Court explained the policy behind this principle, stating, "Ordinarily, a 
corporation is regarded as a separate and distinct legal entity from its stockholders. 
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The purpose of such separation is to insulate the stockholders from the liabilities of the 
corporation, thus limiting their liability to only the amount that the stockholders 
voluntarily put at risk." James, 761 P.2d at 46. Thus, absent some other factual basis 
to establish liability, the Salazars' allegation that Christensen is a mere shareholder of 
Thrifty Nickel of Orem bars their action against him. 
B. The Salazars Did Not Allege Any Facts To Support A Claim Of 
Piercing The Corporate VeU Of Thrifty Nickel Of Orem To Hold 
Christensen Personally Liable, 
The Salazars vaguely alluded in their Complaint to a "corporate veil 
distinguishing or protecting the assets of any of the five defendants." (See Complaint at 
1f 37; R. 5.) But the Salazars have not and are completely unable to plead or show any 
of the requisite facts or necessary elements to support a piercing of the corporate veil 
claim against Christensen. 
Utah courts will only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the corporate veil. See 
James, 761 P.2d at 46; Cascade Energy and Metals Corp. v. Banks. 896 F.2d 1557 
(10th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Utah veil-piercing law). Accordingly, in order to pierce 
a corporate veil and hold Christensen personally liable for the debts of Thrifty Nickel of 
Orem, Utah law requires that the Salazars satisfy two distinct elements. In Norman v. 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co.. 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court 
explained these two elements, adopting a two-prong test to determine when 
disregarding the corporate entity is justified: 
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[I]n order to disregard the corporate entity, there must be a 
concurrence of two circumstances: (1) there must be such 
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities 
of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, viz., 
the corporation is, in fact, the alter ego of one or a few 
individuals; and (2) the observance of the corporate form 
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable 
result would follow. 
Id at 1030. 
Thus, in order to state a claim of piercing a corporate veil, the Salazars must be 
able to at least allege facts demonstrating that (1) there was such a unity of interest and 
ownership between Christensen and Thrifty Nickel of Orem such that Thrifty Nickel of 
Orem no longer existed but was instead the alter ego of Christensen; and (2) that the 
observance of the corporate form of Thrifty Nickel of Orem would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or that an inequitable result would follow. IcL The Salazars utterly 
failed to plead or otherwise show facts to satisfy either of these pleading requirements, 
much less both of them, as they must. 
Instead, the only allegation in the complaint even mentioning a "corporate veil" 
is Paragraph 37 of the Complaint, stating: "There should be no corporate veil 
distinguishing or protecting any assets of the five defendants." (See Complaint 1 at 37; 
R. 5.) This single, conclusory reference to a "corporate veil," without any specific 
mention of Christensen, or any facts alleged to establish the requisite elements of a veil-
piercing claim against Christensen, is entirely inadequate to sustain a veil-piercing 
claim. See infra. 
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1. The Salazars Cannot Allege Facts to Satisfy the Alter Ego 
Prong Required to Support a Veil-Piercing Theory. 
Although the Salazars alleged that Christensen was a shareholder of Thrifty 
Nickel of Orem, the Salazars did not allege that the corporate form of Thrifty Nickel of 
Orem did not exist but was the instead the alter ego of one or a few individuals. The 
alter ego prong requires further factual allegations that the statutory formalities 
regarding corporations have not been met and can only be established "upon a showing 
of the corporation's failure to observe said statutory formalities." Messick v. PHD 
Trucking Serv.. Inc., 678 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1984). No such allegations exist that 
Thrifty Nickel of Orem failed to follow statutory formalities. Although the Salazars 
alleged in the Complaint that "Thrifty Nickel was and is owned in whole or part by 
defendant Christensen" (see Complaint at if 21; R. 3), alleged in their opposition 
memorandum that Christensen is the "kingpin" of the "Thrifty Nickel Empire" (See 
Salazars Memorandum in Opposition at p. 2; R. 97), and alleged at the hearing on the 
motion to dismiss that, "[Christensen] is the kingpin of this organization, the godfather, 
the president, whatever we want to refer to him ..." (See Tr. of Hearing at p. 11:9-10; 
R. 171), these meaningless, gratuitous allegations do not in any way relate to, much 
less satisfy, the alter ego prong. Supra. 
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2. The Salazars Cannot Allege Facts to Satisfy the 
Fraud/Inequities Prong Required to Support a Veil-
Piercing Theory. 
The Salazars likewise cannot meet the inequities requirement of the second 
prong. Even if they could satisfy the alter ego prong, the Salazars must also meet the 
second prong, the inequities prong, to pierce the corporate veil. Norman, 596 P.2d at 
1030. But the inequities prong is not satisfied simply because it may be difficult for the 
Salazars to be made whole. Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & 
Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 26 (Utah 1990). Rather, the Salazars must allege facts 
demonstrating that Christensen used the corporate form of Thrifty Nickel of Orem to 
promote injustice or sanction fraud. E.g., Norman, 596 P.2d at 1090; Baldwin v. 
Matthew R. White Invs., Inc., 669 F.Supp. 1054, 1057 (D. Utah 1987). 
Not surprisingly, there is not a single allegation by the Salazars that Christensen 
engaged in any inequitable conduct that would sanction a fraud or promote injustice. 
However, after having been educated on the bare elements for a veil-piercing claim by 
Christensen's motion to dismiss, the Salazars, for the very first time, state in their 
appellate brief that, "In the instant case, allowing Mr. Christensen to hide behind the 
corporate form would sanction fraud, promote injustice, and result in inequity." (See 
Salazars' Brief at p. 35.) The Salazars now offer this completely conclusory statement, 
yet they entirely fail to state what fraud has been sanctioned, what injustice has been 
promoted and/or what inequity has resulted from the observance of the corporate form 
of Thrifty Nickel of Orem. The Salazars' new allegation of Christensen promoting 
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fraud, made for the first time on appeal, cannot, and does not, save their Complaint and 
further fails to meet the requirement of Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) that averments of fraud be 
set forth with particularity. Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
Indeed, Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b)'s particularity requirement "reach[es] all 
circumstances where the pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentation, omissions, or 
other deceptions covered by the term 'fraud' in its broadest dimensions." Williams v. 
State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah 1982). A simple allegation of "fraud" is 
a general accusation and will not withstand a motion to dismiss. Heathman v. Hatch. 
372 P.2d 990, 991 (Utah 1962). Rather, the basic facts must be set forth with 
sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute such charges. Id. 
Within the context of piercing the corporate veil, federal Rule 9(b), identical to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b), is consistently interpreted as requiring a pleader to satisfy the 
specificity requirements of Rule 9(b) where an allegation of fraud is used to support a 
corporate veil-piercing claim. See Laborers Combined Funds of Western Pennsylvania 
v. Ruscitto. 848 F.Supp. 598 (W.D. Pa. 1994); Gabriel Capital. L.P. v. NatWest Fin.. 
Inc.. 122 F.Supp.2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters 
Pension Fund v. Ceiling Wall Svs.. Inc.. 915 F.Supp. 939 (N.D. 111. 1996); Jack 
LaLanne Fitness Centers. Inc. v. Jimlar. Inc.. 884 F.Supp. 162 (D.N.J. 1995). The 
Salazars have never set forth any facts, much less facts with the particularity required to 
support a fraud allegation. Thus, even if the conclusory statement from their appellate 
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brief had been alleged in the Complaint, it still would not suffice to state a claim to 
pierce the corporate veil of Thrifty Nickel of Orem. See kL 
Because of the presumption that shareholders are not personally responsible for 
the debts of a corporation, because the Salazars have alleged that Christensen is a 
shareholder of Thrifty Nickel of Orem, and because the Salazars have not and cannot 
plead facts demonstrating elements necessary to pierce the corporate veil as to 
Christensen, the trial court correctly dismissed their claims against Christensen with 
prejudice pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See supra. This Court should 
therefore affirm the sound decision of the trial court. 
C. Even If The Trial Court Considered The Defective Affidavits 
And Other Extraneous Materials Filed In Opposition To The 
Motion To Dismiss, The Salazars Still Could Not State A Claim 
Against Christensen, 
Because Christensen's Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion was based solely on the 
allegations contained in the Complaint, the trial court was only to consider whether 
those allegations stated a claim and this Court should likewise only consider the 
allegations and documents attached to the original complaint. See Colman, 795 P.2d at 
624. The trial court found the allegations and material attached to the Complaint failed, 
as a matter of law, to state a claim against Christensen. (See Order of Dismissal; R. 
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159-160.) Nevertheless, even if the trial court had considered the defective affidavits2 
filed in opposition to Christensen's motion to dismiss (see Affidavits attached to 
Salazars' opposition to motion to dismiss; R. 106-116), there are no facts stated in 
those affidavits that would support a claim against Christensen. 
The affidavits claimed that the agreement "was suggested by, discussed around 
the table with, and approved by . . . Christensen and his wife . . . ." (see Affidavit of 
Tim Taylor at 1 4; R. 107.) and that Tim Taylor, as Christensen's agent, signed the 
agreement.3 (See Affidavit of Tim Taylor at 1 5; R. 107.) The Salazars also asserted 
in their opposition memorandum that Christensen "personally benefited from the 
services of [the Salazars]," that Christensen and the Salazars had a "close friendship 
evidenced by many specific requests for personal services and inviting them over for 
holiday meals," and that Christensen "valued their significant contributions to the 
growing organization." (See Salazars' Memorandum in Opposition at p. 7; R. 102.) 
2
 Statements that would not be admissible at trial may not properly be set forth 
in an affidavit and must be stricken. Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 
P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973). Courts routinely exclude or disregard affidavits containing 
statements that are without foundation, conclusory, or unsubstantiated opinions and 
beliefs. See, e ^ , Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). 
3
 Taylor's statement in paragraph 5 of his affidavit that he signed the agreement 
"as an agent for . . . Christensen" (see Taylor Affidavit at 1 5; R. 107) was an 
unsupported legal conclusion without any foundation which was properly disregarded 
by the trial court. Moreover, it was inconsistent with the terms of the alleged 
Employment Agreement itself which nowhere mentions Christensen. (See Agreement 
attached to Complaint; R. 8, 10.) At most, Taylor signed personally or as an agent of 
Thrifty Nickel of Orem. 
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A shareholder's suggestion that an entity obtain an employment agreement or 
even approval of an agreement that is not signed by the shareholder in his individual 
capacity does not bind the shareholder to the agreement. See, e ^ , Shire Dev., 799 
P.2d at 223. That Christensen and the Salazars allegedly had a close friendship and 
that he may have obtained some indirect benefit from an employee's service to a 
corporation in which he had an equity or stock interest likewise does not create a 
legally binding obligation upon Christensen personally. Id; James, 761 P.2d at 46. 
To the contrary, the Salazars were quite clear in their affidavits that they worked for 
"several Thrifty Nickel companies," not Christensen. (See Affidavits of Jose and 
Mildred Salazar at 1 5; R. I l l , R. 115.) 
The Salazars alleged that Christensen "reaffirmed the validity of the employment 
agreement and his commitments to it in return for the Salazars' services in August 1999 
when transferring Salazars to another Thrifty Nickel company." (See Salazars' 
Memorandum in Opposition at p. 7; R. 102.) This contention misstated the admissible 
contents of the affidavits. The affidavits allege that the Salazars have worked for other 
"Thrifty Nickel Companies" (see Affidavits of Tim Taylor and the Salazars at 1f1 8 and 
5, respectively; R. I l l ; R. 115), and that when the Salazars went to work in Salt Lake 
City, Christensen said, "all will be the same." (See Affidavits of Jose and Mildred 
Salazar at f 9; R. 111-112; R. 115-116.) Any such alleged statement by Christensen 
does not amount to a personal assumption of the obligations of any corporate entity, 
much less any specific obligations under the Agreement. See, e.g.. James. 761 P.2d at 
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46. In fact, there was no allegation that the Agreement itself was even mentioned by 
Christensen to the Salazars. Moreover, as discussed above, the Salazars' counsel's 
statements at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that, "[Christensen is] the father of 
this organization. The - it's his family, he's a mega-multi-millionaire, well on his way 
to being a billionaire ..." (See Tr. of Hearing at p. 9, 18-20; R. 171) or that, 
"[Christensen] is the kingpin of this organization, the godfather, the president, 
whatever we want to refer to him ..." (See Tr. of Hearing at p. 10:9-10; R. 171) failed 
to state any additional viable facts under which Christensen could be held liable for the 
debts of Thrifty Nickel of Orem. See supra. The trial court therefore correctly granted 
the motion to dismiss with prejudice and this Court should affirm. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
LEAVE TO AMEND. BECAUSE THE SALAZARS FAILED TO FOLLOW 
ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS OR PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING 
AMENDMENT, AMENDMENT WOULD BE FUTILE, AND THE 
SALAZARS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 
TO FISH OUT A CLAIM AGAINST CHRISTENSEN. 
The trial court's decision denying leave to amend should not be disturbed unless 
the trial court abused its discretion and, under that standard, the Court of Appeals will 
not reverse the decision unless it exceeds the limits of reasonability. Neztsosie, 883 
P.2d at 922; Jirard. 660 P.2d at 248; Crossland Sav.. 877 P.2d at 1243. It was 
reasonable and thus not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny leave where: 
1) the Salazars failed to file a motion for leave to amend as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(b)(1) and failed to identify what any amendment would be; 2) amendment would be 
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futile because the Salazars failed to present any facts that could state an additional claim 
against Christensen even if their extraneously filed materials are considered; and 3) the 
Salazars should not be allowed to conduct discovery in a desperate attempt to fish out a 
claim against Christensen. See infra. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Leave 
To Amend, Because The Salazars Utterly Failed To Satisfy The 
Requirements And Procedure For Requesting Leave, 
For an order granting them leave to amend, the Salazars were required to file a 
motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). That Rule provides, "An application to the 
court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall 
be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set 
forth the relief or order sought." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1). In applying the identical 
federal Rule 7(b)(1), the Tenth Circuit stated, "normally a court need not grant leave to 
amend when a party failed to file a formal motion." Calderon v. Kan. Dept. of Soc. 
and Rehabilitation Servs.. 181 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999). The Salazars never 
filed a proper motion for leave. Instead, they made only a single fleeting reference to 
amendment in their memorandum in opposition to Christensen's motion to dismiss (see 
Salazars' Memorandum in Opposition at p. 8; R. 103) and they never mentioned 
amendment at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. (See Tr. of Hearing; R. 171.) 
Thus, the Salazars woefully failed to meet or even attempt to meet the requirements of 
Rule 7(b)(1). Moreover, the Salazars were free at any time prior to dismissal to 
actually file an amended complaint. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) ("A party may amend 
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his pleading only by leave of court . . . and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires.") However, they chose not to do so, presumably because they simply could 
not state a claim against Christensen. 
In Calderon, the Tenth Circuit found that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying leave to amend where no motion for leave was ever submitted and 
no amendment to the complaint was ever proposed that would have provided the 
defendant with sufficient notice or factual basis for any amendment to the complaint. 
Calderon, 181 F.3d at 1186. Similarly, here the Salazars never filed a motion or 
specified below what facts they could allege to support any additional claims against 
Christensen. Neither Christensen nor the trial court could have had any notice 
whatsoever of what additional claims the amendment would state against Christensen. 
It was therefore entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court to deny the 
Salazars' request to amend and this Court should affirm. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying 
Leave. Because Amending The Complaint Would Be Futile, 
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend a complaint 
where the proposed amendment would fail to plead all of the required elements for the 
proposed claim, thus rendering amendment futile. DeBry, 835 P.2d at 1008-1009; 
Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda (New York) Ltd.. 209 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir. 2000); see also 
Havden v. Gravson. 134 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 524 U.S. 953 (1998). 
In DeBry, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of a claim without leave to amend, 
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because DeBry was unable to allege all of the required elements for the proposed claim. 
DeBry, 835 P.2d at 1008-1009. Because the Salazars are similarly unable to allege any 
factual basis for an additional claim against Christensen, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in dismissing the Salazars' claims with prejudice and the decision should be 
affirmed. 
Furthermore, a court properly may deny a motion for leave to amend as futile 
when the proposed amended complaint would be subject to dismissal for any reason. 
Bauchmanv. W. HighSch.. 132 F.3d 542, 562 (10th Cir. 1997), citing AM Int'L Inc. 
v. Graphic Management Assoc, Inc.. 44 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Am. 
Trans. Air. Inc.. 874 F.2d 386, 392 (7th Cir. 1989). In Bauchman. the 10th Circuit 
found that because the proffered amended complaint, along with the supporting 
evidence and affidavits, failed to cure the deficiencies in the original complaint and 
could not allege the required elements of the proposed claim, denial of the motion for 
leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. Bauchman. 132 F.3d at 562. 
Here, the Salazars did not specify below what facts they could allege, consistent 
with Utah R. Civ. P. 11, that might state a claim against Christensen. Instead, as 
discussed above regarding the insufficiency of the Complaint and the extraneous filings, 
the Salazars demonstrated that they could not cure the fatal defects as to Christensen 
even with all of their additionally supplemented documents. See supra. Thus, any 
amendment of the Complaint would be futile and the trial court did not abuse its 
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discretion in denying amendment. DeBry, 835 P.2d at 1008-1009; see supra. This 
Court should affirm this sound decision of the trial court. IcL 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying 
Leave And Preventing The Salazars From Going On A 
Discovery Fishing Expedition In An Attempt To Discover Facts 
Upon Which To Base A Claim Against Christensen. 
Finally, the Salazars argue that they should be entitled to amend, because 
discovery might provide them with facts enabling them to state a claim against 
Christensen. (See Salazars' Brief at pp. 29, 37.) This argument only further highlights 
the desperate and futile nature of the Salazars' claims. More importantly, however, it 
flies in the face of the sound policy, discussed below, of curbing unnecessary litigation 
and discouraging legally insufficient claims prior to filing. 
A party cannot commence an action without stating a legally cognizable claim 
and then conduct discovery in an attempt to find one. DeBry, 835 P.2d at 1008-1009; 
see United Ins. Co. of Am. v. Harris. 939 F.Supp. 1527, 1537 (M.D.Ala. 1996). In 
Harris, the court succinctly explained the policy behind this rule, stating that if 
plaintiffs are permitted to "sue first and ask questions later ... all will lose-plaintiffs, 
defendants, the court system, and the public~for everyone will have lost sight of Rule 
l l ' s laudatory goal of curbing litigation by stressing 'the need for some prefiling 
inquiry into both the facts and the law.'" Harris. 939 F.Supp. 1527 at 1537, quoting 
Advisory Committee Notes to 1983 amendments to the federal rules of civil procedure. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 11 is virtually identical to F.R.C.P. 11 and interpretations of the 
federal rules are persuasive in interpreting the Utah Rules. See supra. 
Nevertheless, directly contrary to this policy and law, the Salazars argue, 
"Appellants should be given an opportunity through discovery to prove that Mr. 
Christensen was, in fact, a party to the Employment Contract." (See Salazars' Brief at 
p. 17.) The Salazars also baldly claim that discovery will somehow produce facts that 
will support a claim to hold Christensen liable, stating, "Whether Thrifty Nickel can be 
shown to be the alter ego of Robert Christensen will [b]e proven upon completion of 
plaintiffs' discovery." (See Salazars' Brief at p. 31.) This plea to conduct a fishing 
expedition in an attempt to discover facts upon which to base a claim runs counter to 
the sound policy of discouraging the filing of complaints that lack any basis. See supra. 
The Salazars have offered no special reason why they would somehow be exempt from 
the salutary policy of saving potential defendants and courts from the filing of claims 
that have no basis and then using discovery in an attempt to desperately find some 
cognizable claim. 
The DeBrv case is instructional here. In DeBry, this Court upheld dismissal of 
the complaint and denial of leave to amend where DeBry could not allege the essential 
elements of a claim, yet argued for additional discovery in order to find facts to support 
the claim. DeBrv, 835 P.2d at 1008-1009. The Court succinctly stated, "[plaintiff] 
and their counsel are [not] free to make Valley Mortgage a defendant and hope to turn 
26 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
up a claim against them in the course of discovery. There needs to be an end to the 
time and expense imposed on Valley Mortgage as a defendant in the [plaintiff's fishing 
expedition." DeBry, 835 P.2d at 1009. The Court in DeBrv thus expressly 
condemned exactly what the Salazars are now attempting to do - use discovery to fish 
out claims. IcL The Salazars have demonstrated that they have no factual basis for any 
claims against Christensen. There simply needs to be an end to the time and expense 
imposed on Christensen as a defendant in the Salazars' fishing expedition. The time is 
now. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, Appellee respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Salazars' Complaint with prejudice. 
DATED: September j £ , 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
$fott A. C2M/I 
James H. T\\ 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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